The IPA is so immensely useful for linguistics that nobody questions its use, even though it sometimes creates misunderstandings (e.g. the misconception that the characters defined in the IPA represent the set of possible sounds in the world’s languages). Continue reading
Suppose you hear that a colleague is working on a language called “@t~q^M#%”. What is your reaction? What’s wrong with the language name “@t~q^M#%”? It’s perfectly unique, it consists only of ASCII characters so is eminently typable, and it has a certain beauty. But of course it lacks pronounceability, so is it good as a name? In general, we expect a language to have a name that we can use in speaking about the language, not only in writing. Continue reading
Those who know me better will be aware that I keep insisting on careful use of terminology in linguistics, especially in grammar (my main area of research), but also in other areas – for example, I often point out that it’s very problematic to use the term borrowing only for cases of copying (of words and other features from a donor language) that were NOT due to imperfect learning of a second language (i.e. substrate effects). The reason is that we need a general term for all kinds of copying, because in many or most cases we don’t know the circumstances under which the copying took place. But copying as a general term, with borrowing as a special kind of copying, simply won’t work: The terms borrowing and loan have been deeply entrenched in linguistics for over a century, and changing terminology so that a more general term comes to mean something more special simply won’t work for the whole discipline. Those who want to use borrowing in this narrow sense will perpertually have to say “borrowing in the sense of Thomason & Kaufman (1988)”.
I don’t have a good recipe what to do to avoid the constant creation of new confusion due to new meanings of old terms, and maybe not everyone feels it in the same way as I do. Many linguists inhabit only small corners of the discipline, and they have no trouble communicating with the other specialists of their (sub-)subfield. But those of us who are trying to get a bigger picture notice the problems quickly (and of course it gets worse when trying to learn from adjacent fields such as psychology or cultural evolution studies).
If you’ve read till here, then you probably have some interest in problems of terminology, so here are some more relevant considerations:
– One way in which one could improve the situation is by setting up nomenclature committees in linguistics associations, as they exist in fields such as astronomy and biology. Or at least one could organize sessions at big linguistics conferences (such as the SLE or the LSA) to discuss questions of terminology.
– Linguists often react negatively to the creation of new terms, even though they create new concepts all the time. In word-formation studies, this negative reaction to new words has a name: neophobia. But like all pathological fears, this can be cured, and it is clear that a proliferaton of technical terms is much better than a proliferation of meanings of an existing term. Synonyms can be easily mapped onto each other (in some contexts even automatically), while disambiguating polysemous terms requires a lot of knowledge.
– In the age of powerful search engines, terms that consist of unique strings have an edge over terms that just new metaphors. It is thus better to coin a term like quark than a term like string, because the latter has many different meanings in different domains. This extends to the use of hyphens with compounds – it is for this reason that I put hyphens in the terms thing-root, action-root, and property-root (as comparative concepts for nouns, verbs and adjectives, Haspelmath 2012).
– It is not true that terminological confusion is unavoidable, because a century ago the situation was much worse: Almost only terms that people knew were the terms of classical grammar, and it was very difficult to communicate across countries (let alone continents), and to look up earlier usage. Many new terms have been coined in the meantime, and with Wikpedia and internet search engines, we have excellent ways of looking up information.
– One principle of good terminology is that one should not give a new narrow meaning to an old term with very vague meanings. Some terms are so polysemous that it’s better to dispense with them entirely (e.g. markedness, Haspelmath 2006).
– Another principle is that a precise definition of a previously widely used (but ill-defined) term should not diverge too much in its extension from previous usage, because of retro-compatibility. The term aorist may not have a precise and consistent definition in the earlier literature, but if giving it a new definition involving some kind of irrealis modality or illocution would only cause confusion, because previous usages are in the domain of aspect.
– It is important to note that grammatical terminology for comparative concepts is essentially different from terminology for particular languages (Haspelmath 2010). Language-particular terms are best capitalized (e.g. the German Subjunctive mood), but here standardization is much easier anyway. The truly challenging aspect of linguistic terminology is the development of widely understood comparative concepts for grammar.
Dictionaries are structured databases, and they are linear only because of the inflexible paper medium of earlier times. Like linear phonebooks, linear timetable books, or antiquarian book catalogs, they are bound to disappear, but the process seems to be much slower. I’ve been wondering if there is a reason for this – does linearity perhaps serve a useful purpose in dictionaries? Continue reading
(The following is a slightly edited conversation that took place on Facebook recently, on Roberta D’Alessandro’s page. There’s also one comment by Roberta. It’s reproduced here with permission.)
Martin Haspelmath (Reacting to a Facebook comment that it’s hard to understand the syntax of human languages): Syntax suddenly starts working if it’s framework-free! But I admit it may not be so cool…
Richard Larson: Same is true for physics! It suddenly “starts working” if you toss out all this silly theorizing about forces, particles and least effort principles! 🙂
Martin Haspelmath: Have you read my paper about framework-free theory, Richard? I’d be curious to hear what you’d say about it. I find the reasoning quite compelling, and I’d like to hear counterarguments. Continue reading
Last week I was at one of the most unusual and stimulating events I’ve attended in a long time – a workshop on “Variation and universals” organized by Roberta D’Alessandro and Marc van Oostendorp, bringing together syntacticians and phonologists, macrotypologists and microvariantionists, and generativists and linguists who were unsure how to describe themselves. The goal was to think at a higher level than usually about the role of typological data and universal claims in understanding language(s). Continue reading
A recent issue of the journal “Linguistic Typology” contains a number of articles on the usefulness of typology, among others one by Nikolaus Himmelmann on the usefulness of typology for language documentation (2016). Himmelmann bluntly criticizes the theoretical stance of separating description from comparison: Continue reading
In J. L. Austin’s theory a “speech act” is an utterance that achieves some action by virtue of its being spoken, “I thee wed,” “I hereby open the 23rd International …”, etc. but not “The king of France is bald,” “Did you go to the party yesterday?”, etc.
I have recently witnessed an inclination at workshops in religious studies to refer to magic as speech acts. The motivation is to not dismiss magic as hocus pocus, but instead take an emic perspective; the effort fails. To claim that hoc est corpus … constitutes a speech act is to admit that nothing essential happens to the bread and thereby rejects the emic. The more respectful participant observer would admit the magic is magic and admit it works.
Linguists have stretched “speech acts” yet further; to them it is simply a synonym for ”utterance”. Speaker and hearer are dubbed “speech act participants”, which, in the perennial quest to make prose opaque, become SAPs. This choice of terminology is particularly unfortunate because in Austin’s formulation a third person, such as the witness at a wedding, is often a participant in a speech act. If somehow Linguists cannot bear the tired old words “speaker” and “hearer” they could try ”interlocutors”, but please let Austin have speech acts, without attempting to bathe in his reflected glory.
Complex spatial flags often consist of two or even three elements, of which typically one corresponds to the configuration (‘inside’, ‘on’, ‘under’, ‘next to’, etc.), and one to the direction (‘to’, ‘at’, ‘from’, ‘via’), as illustrated by English, Finnish and Lezgian below. These sorts of phenomena are the topic of an interesting typological paper by Lestrade, de Schepper and Zwarts (2011). Continue reading
Ideophones —vivid sensory words found in many of the world’s languages— are often described as having little or no morphosyntax. That simple statement conceals an interesting puzzle. It is not often that we can define a word class across languages in terms of its syntax (or lack thereof). After all, most major types of word classes show intriguing patterns of cross-linguistic variation. There is no particular reason to expect that the morphosyntactic position or degree of embedding of, say, noun-like or verb-like words will be similar across unrelated languages. Indeed that is why typologists define comparative concepts primarily by reference to semantic rather than grammatical or morphosyntactic properties (Croft 2003; Haspelmath 2007). Continue reading
(The following conversation reflects some of the discussions that we had over the last few years, and particularly at a recent mini-workshop at WIKO Berlin.)
Martin Haspelmath: In the typological literature of the last decade, one finds more and more instances of people claiming that this or that typological generalization actually has a diachronic explanation. Continue reading
Quite a few people have argued in recent times that typological distributions should be explained with reference to diachronic change (e.g. Bybee (1988; 2006; 2008), Blevins (2004), Anderson (2005; 2016), (Plank 2007), Creissels (2008), and Cristofaro (2010; 2013; 2014)). As Bickel et al. (2015: 29) put it:
“statistical universals are not really synchronic in nature, but are rather the result of underlying diachronic mechanisms that cause languages to change in preferred or ‘natural’ ways”
This view seems to have been articulated first by Greenberg (1969; 1978), Continue reading
Whenever generative approaches claim that they can account for broadly cross-linguistic regularities, I try to pay close attention. In a recent short paper in Linguistic Inquiry, Moskal (2015) is concerned with the generalization that nouns may show number suppletion (e.g. Russian rebënok ‘child’, deti ‘children’), but almost never suppletion for case, whereas personal pronouns often show number suppletion (e.g. English I/we) as well as case suppletion (e.g. English I/me, we/us). This seems to be a robust observation, Continue reading
Oxford University Press just published the first issue of its new Journal of Language Evolution, seemingly a logical consequence of the increased popularity of evolution-oriented studies at least since the first Evolang conference in 1996. But what is “language evolution”?
One would think that the opening editorial of a new journal would say something about its scope, i.e. that it would tell us a bit more about what falls under “language evolution” in the sense of the new journal. But Continue reading
In a number of publications over the years, Stephen Anderson has advanced the idea that phonological and morphosyntactic phenomena should often be explained diachronically, rather than with reference to the innate Language Faculty (a.k.a. Universal Grammar) (cf. Anderson 2005; 2008; 2016). For someone who has been a very prominent generative phonologist and morphologist (cf. Anderson 1974; 1992), this is remarkable. In the generative meaninstream, very few linguists have even entertained the possibility that core properties of grammars (such as distinctive features and alternations in phonology, or case-marking rules in syntax) might be explained by anything other than UG. The notion that “linguistic theory” (= what generative linguists are engaged in) consists in elucidating the constraints of our cognitive apparatus on possible mental grammars is still widely taken for granted. Thus, Anderson’s arguments are interesting Continue reading